LIC Of India Vs. Insure Policy Plus Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors(SC)(29 Dec, 2015)

Held: Parliament intended to allow all previous assignments and transfers provided that they complied with the requirements laid out in Section 38. In the face of this clear legislative intent, no other interpretation of Section 38 is possible. It is accordingly not incumbent for court to discuss whether insurance policies partake of the nature of social security, or whether the transfer of such policies tantamount to wagering contracts. It is not open to the Appellants to charter a course which is different to the postulation in the Insurance Act, by means of its own Circulars. The position obtains has diametrically opposite inasmuch as the statute permitted, at the relevant time, the assignment and/or transfer of life insurance policies, but the delegate, through its Circulars, has attempted to nullify that provision of law. Court conclude, therefore, that the circulars are ultra vires the Statute and must therefore be made ineffectual. Appeal dismissed.

Judgements/Tribunals

Content right to :eJurix

Balkrishna Industries Ltd. Vs. The Union of India and others(HC-Bom) (23 Dec, 2015)

Held:It is common ground before court that up until 2015 no exemption was ever granted from payment of Safeguard Duty levied under section 8C of the CTA, 1975. An exemption by its very nature is a freedom from an obligation which the exemptee is otherwise liable to discharge. It is a privilege granting an advantage not available to others. An exemption under a statutory provision in a taxing statute is by its nature a concession granted by the Under Notification No.96/2009-Cus. dated 11th September 2009, admittedly no exemption was ever granted from payment of Safeguard Duty imposed under section 8C of the CTA, 1975. As noted earlier, the two sections clearly operate in two different fields. Whilst section 8B is article specific, section 8C is article specific and country specific inasmuch as imposition of Transitional Product Specific Safeguard Duty under section 8C comes into play only with reference to a specific article that is imported from the People's Republic of China. Therefore, there is a clear distinction between the two sections and if the Government, as a policy, decides to exempt one and not the other, the same cannot be termed as an unreasonable classification requiring courts interference. This being purely a policy matter decided by experts in the field, cannot be subjected to a judicial review in this fashion. Writ Petition dismissed.

Limtex Tea & Industries Ltd. Vs. Asstt. C.I.T(ITAT-CAL)(15 Jan, 2016)

Held:The subsidy in question is revenue subsidy and was rightly brought to tax. The Finance Act, 2015 with effect from 01/04/2016 has inserted of Sub-Clause (xviii) in Section 2(24) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 providing an inclusive definition of the expression 'Income'. any subsidy/grant/reimbursement, which is taken into account and reduced from the actual cost of depreciable assets while determining the same under Section 43(1) shall not be treated as income. The second part is that, if the value of the subsidy is reduced from the value of actual cost u/s.43(1) of the Act for allowing depreciation, than the subsidy will not be taxed as "income”.Therefore the 1st part cannot be regarded as having retrospective operation. The second part of the amended provision of Sec.2(24)(xviii) of the Act gives a relief in the form of relieving double taxation, one in the form of the subsidy being taxed as income and again the value of subsidy being reduced from the actual cost of fixed assets on which depreciation is to be allowed. It is not possible to regard one part of an amended provision as having retrospective operation and the other part having only prospective operation. In the present case there is no dispute that the other conditions laid down in Explanation 10 to Sec.43(1) of the Act are satisfied. Appeal dismissed.